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The idea of free schooling is primarily about removing thefinancial barriers to education. Two mechanisms havebeen introduced to alleviate the financial costs of
schooling for poor children: School-fee exemptions, intro-
duced by the South African Schools Act of 1996 and outlined
in the regulations of 2006, and the no-fee school policy
outlined in the Amended National Norms and Standards for
School Funding of 2006. 
Although these policies are ostensibly about addressing
financial barriers to education, they are also part of a broader
education funding strategy designed to promote more
equitable access to better quality education. 
This essay outlines the two fee-waiver policies and
describes how they are meant to work in practice, and then
considers the implementation and effect of no-fee schools as
a redistributive mechanism:
 What policies govern school fees and school funding?
 How are the school quintiles determined for no-fee schools?
 How has the quintile system been implemented?
 Are the current funding allocations adequate?
 What are some of the implementation challenges facing 
no-fee schools?
 How does the policy impact on school revenue and quality
education?
This essay draws partly on a study of the implementation and
impact of the no-fee and exemption policies, commissioned
by the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security
(ACESS) in 2008. The study combined policy and literature
reviews with primary research and secondary analysis of data
from three provinces. An analysis of national Education
Management Information System (EMIS) data was under-
taken by the Children’s Institute and is presented here for the
first time.   
What policies govern school fees and school
funding?
Post-apartheid funding policy in education aimed to support
the development of a new national system of education that,
according to the Schools Act, aimed to “redress past injus-
tices in educational provision [and] provide an education of
progressively high quality for all learners”. 
Education funding policy is therefore explicitly oriented
towards improving the quality of school education by
redressing the historic inequalities in school funding. Given
the spatial distribution of schools and the communities they
serve, it is extremely difficult to equalise resources and
reduce inequality. More importantly, the norms and standards
funding model relates to a very small part of the education
budget, while the bulk of spending (on teaching salaries) is
not redistributive.  
As discussed in the previous essay, national policy in the
1990s required cuts in the number of teaching staff to boost
expenditure on equipment and learning materials. If anything,
this approach increased disparities in the quality of education:
Schools with relatively wealthy parent bodies were able to
raise funds to employ more teaching staff, while education
suffered in schools serving poor communities. The Amended
Norms and Standards acknowledge the irony that, “given the
emphasis on redress and equity, the funding provisions of the
Act appear to have worked thus far to the advantage of public
schools patronised by middle-class and wealthy parents.”
School-fee exemptions and no-fee schools are both attempts
to redistribute resources and improve access to quality
education, but they fail to address unequal teaching capacity
because salaries are not allocated on a pro-poor basis.  
School-fee exemption
The school-fee exemption is meant to be redistributive in that
it enables children from poor areas to access fee-charging
schools in better resourced areas. In effect, paying parents
directly subsidise poorer learners. As school fees are set by
the school governing body (SGB), they vary according to what
the school community considers necessary and affordable. 
Having set the fees at the ‘affordable’ level, the school is
required to exempt learners from households with incomes
that fall below a prescribed means test. The formula for the
means test takes into account the combined income of the
parents and number of school-going children they support in
relation to the annual school fees set by the SGB. In addition,
certain categories of children (or their caregivers) are
automatically eligible for full exemptions, irrespective of their
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income, including children in foster care, kinship care or
child-headed households, and those receiving social grants. 
The main criticism of the policy is that it is unfunded:
Schools are not reimbursed, so each exemption is a loss of
revenue for the school, with implications for the quality of
education it offers. A counter-argument is that it may not be
an equitable use of public resources to spend large propor-
tions of the education budget on reimbursing schools that
charge fees, at the expense of investments in poorer schools.
While the debate has largely been polarised between an ‘all or
nothing’ approach, a compromise allowing for partial
reimbursement could be considered. The Department of
Education (DoE) has indicated that it is investigating possible
compensation for fee exemptions. 
The lack of compensation has made schools extremely
reluctant to implement the exemption policy, and even to
accept learners who may be unable to pay fees. Nume-
rous commentators, including Veriava and Fiske and
Ladd, reported that almost no exemptions were applied
for or granted in the first few years. 
Two important developments have increased implemen-
tation of the exemption policy. First, the exemption regulations
of 2006 made it compulsory for schools to inform parents
about the policy and how to apply for a fee exemption. This
included a sample letter and form to send to all parents to
confirm that they had been made aware of the exemption. 
The second event was a High Court judgment in 2007,
which clarified that the exemption policy must be imple-
mented by schools and enforced by provincial education
departments (see case 4).
No-fee schools
In 2007, a new funding policy was implemented nationally, in
which the poorest 40% of schools were granted no-fee status.
No-fee schools may not charge fees; instead, funding alloca-
tions are skewed to ensure that the poorest schools receive
the largest per-learner allocations. The no-fee policy is reliant
on a national poverty ranking system which divides all schools
into quintiles. This forms the basis of a spatially targeted, pro-
poor funding approach. From its inception, the no-fee policy has
been applied to both primary and secondary schools, including
the Further Education and Training phase (grades 10 – 12).
Case 4: Fee exemptions at the Hunt Road Secondary School
In 2006, the mothers of two children attending a Durban
secondary school were sued for school-fee arrears. Both
women were poor, black, single mothers with multiple
dependants, who qualified for fee exemptions. With the help
of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at the
University of the Witwatersrand, they took the school, its
governing body, the provincial and national ministers of
education to court. The main complaint was that they had
not been given an opportunity to apply for the fee exemption
because the school was not following the correct proce-
dures required to implement the policy. 
The defence for the school and its governing body (SGB)
put forward two main arguments. First, it was argued that
the school had limited resources and was already strug-
gling to provide the necessary teachers and facilities to
ensure an adequate education for its learners. CALS
countered that a school’s financial difficulties are no justifi-
cation for failing to comply with the law, and that rather than
(unlawfully) pursuing fee payments from poor parents, the
school could approach the provincial education depart-
ment for funding review. They pointed out that much of the
school’s response constituted a grievance against the
department rather than the impoverished mothers of
learners. For instance, the school had suggested that
despite being in a middle-income area, it should be classi-
fied as a “township” school because many of its learners
commuted from townships. This indicated a problem in the
school’s classification and funding allocation.
Second, the school argued that it had actually complied with
the legal framework, and that the mothers had not applied
for exemptions. However, the applicants pointed out several
instances where the school and SGB failed to comply with
the procedural requirements for the exemption. For
instance, it issued an annual circular to parents which,
instead of explicitly informing them of the policy and appli-
cation procedure (as required by regulation), emphasised
that parents must pay school fees and hinted that parents
in financial difficulty could contact the school to discuss
alternatives. In response to evidence that the mothers had
been turned away when asking about exemptions, the
school said it was because they had asked about “bur-
saries” rather than exemptions. The applicants said this
reduced the issue to a matter of semantics, and showed
that the school and its SGB had not acted in good faith.   
Adv Faranaaz Veriava at CALS emphasised that the case
was not an isolated one — rather, it illustrated a systemic
problem in the design and implementation of policy. The
judgment, in favour of the applicants, affirmed that schools
must comply with the law and implement the exemption
policy. An important implication of the judgment is a shift in
the onus of responsibility: Parents of learners in public
schools cannot be sued for non-payment of fees unless the
school has determined that they do not qualify for an
exemption, and has given them an opportunity to appeal.
Neither the provincial or national departments defended
the action. The DoE publicly supported the judgment, which
required schools to comply with the legislation. 
Source: Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Others v Hunt Road Secondary School and Others, Case No. 10091/2006. High Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local
Division (DCLD) [Unreported]
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How are school quintiles determined?
South Africa's schools are divided into five categories or "quin-
tiles", according to their poverty ranking. The poorest schools
are included in quintile 1 and the least poor in quintile 5. There
are two steps in the classification of schools. First, a national
poverty table, prepared by the Treasury, determines the poverty
ranking of areas based on data from the national census in-
cluding income levels, dependency ratios and literacy rates in
the area. Provinces then rank schools from quintile 1 to 5, accor-
ding to the catchment area of the school. Each national quintile
contains 20% of all learners, with quintile 1 representing the
poorest 20% and quintile 5 the wealthiest 20%. However,
provincial inequalities mean that these quintiles are unevenly
distributed across provinces. According to the 2003 Plan of
Action, the rationale for national ranking (according to the pre-
vious provincial ranking) is to ensure that "equally poor learners
across the country will be subject to the same pro-poor
targeting".
The quintile ranking of a school is important because it
determines the no-fee status of the school. Each year the
Minister of Education determines the quintiles or parts of
quintiles where schools may not charge compulsory school
fees. In 2007, quintiles 1 and 2 were identified as no-fee
schools. 
The quintile ranking determines the amount of money that
a school receives. The poorest schools receive the greatest
per-learner allocation, based on the assumption that schools
in wealthier communities are better able to raise funds and
require less support from government. The policy requires
that 60% of the available resources must be distributed to the
poorest 40% of learners  (ie quintiles 1 and 2).
How are learners and schools distributed across
quintiles?
Although quintile rankings are allocated to schools, the pro-
portions refer not to the institutions, but to the number of
learners in each quintile. Lower quintile schools are smaller,
on average, than upper quintile schools — for instance, the mean
number of learners in quintile 1 schools is 331, compared with
just over 700 learners in quintile 5 schools, based on analysis
of 2008 EMIS data. About a third (34%) of schools nationally
were allocated quintile 1 status in 2008. This achieved coverage
of 26% of learners nationally, resulting in a slight over-repre-
sentation of learners in quintile 1, where the maximum per-
learner allocation applies. Conversely, schools in quintile 5
are relatively large, and only 8.7% of schools were allocated
quintile 5 status, covering 14% of learners nationally.
The national poverty distribution table stipulates what
proportion of learners in each province should be accommo-
dated in each quintile. The quintile system attempts to
address the uneven distribution of poverty across provinces,
with the poorest provinces having the greatest number of
learners in quintiles 1 and 2. For example, 34.8% of learners
in the Eastern Cape should be accommodated in quintile 1
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
26.1% 21.2% 21.9% 16.7% 14.1%






Figure 7:  Distribution of schools and learners across
quintiles, compared to national targets
Source: Department of Education (2008) Education Management Information
System data. Pretoria: DoE. Analysis by Katharine Hall, Children’s Institute, UCT.
Note: Data are based on public ordinary schools in 2008, and exclude 275 out of
24,710 schools where quintile was unspecified.
 Target  Learners   Schools
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schools, as opposed to 6.5% of learners in the relatively
wealthy Western Cape.
An analysis of the actual allocation of quintiles shows the
provincial disparity in quintile allocations and demonstrates
the redistributive nature of the policy. When comparing the
target and actual distribution, a much larger proportion of
learners nationally attend schools in the no-fee category
(quintiles 1 and 2) than envisaged. This raises questions about
whether provincial budgets are sufficient to provide the appro-
priate level learner allocation to so many learners.  
How has the quintile system been 
implemented?
Primary research commissioned by ACESS in 22 schools
across three provinces identified several challenges with the
ranking of schools. Principals of participating schools in the
upper quintiles called for a review of their quintile status based
on learner demographics. The main disputed areas were:
 Outdated source data: Spatial targeting it is not always
precise. The main national data source used to determine
the poverty score is the census, which is quickly outdated 
in the context of urban migration. 
 Ranking errors: In some instances schools in the same
area are ranked differently, resulting in unequal allocations
to schools serving the same community.
 Failure to consider learner demographics: Poor schools 
close to less poor areas may be prejudiced by the relative 
wealth of their neighbours, and ranked in a higher quintile 
than appropriate. The ranking system only considers the 
physical location of the school and does not take into 
account learner demographics. For many reasons, inclu-
ding freedom of choice, quality of education and necessity, 
some poor children go to school in other areas, but the 
spatial-targeting approach does not allow the learner 
subsidy to ‘follow the child’. This, coupled with the lack of 
compensation for fee waivers, means that schools that 
accept these children suffer financially. 
 Masking inequality: Quintile rankings can mask large 
disparities between schools that are ranked equally (within 
and across provinces). 
 Poor communication: Poor communication and lack of 
consultation leave schools and parents confused about 
schools’ status and rank. Misleading statements by politi-
cians about free education have added to the confusion, and 
resulted in parents refusing to pay fees. 
A circuit manager in the Eastern Cape remarked: 
Everybody is fuming with rage with the issue of quintiles …
People do not understand the tools used by the depart-
ment to determine which school should fall into quintile
5 or 1. In the same locality, one [school] can be in quintile
1 and 2 while the one next to it is in quintile 4. The policy
can only be successful if parents fully understand it.
Schools can apply to change their quintile ranking, but it is
not a straightforward process. 
Table 5: National poverty distribution table — targets and actual quintiles, 2008
Sources: Department of Education (2006) Regulations Relating to the Exemption of Parents from Payment of School Fees in Public Schools. Government Gazette No. 29311,
Government Notice No. 1052, 18 October 2006. Pretoria: DoE. Department of Education (2008) Education Management Information System data. Pretoria: DoE. 
Analysis by Katharine Hall, Children’s Institute, UCT.
Note: EMIS data are based on public ordinary schools in 2008, and excludes 275 out of 24,710 schools where quintile was unspecified. An updated poverty table, with revised
quintile rankings, is included in the no-fee schools lists for 2009, published in October 2008 and available on www.education.gov.za.
National quintiles
1 (poorest) 2 3 4 5 (least poor) Total
Target % Actual % Target % Actual % Target % Actual % Target % Actual % Target % Actual % %
Eastern Cape 34.8 34.6 21.6 31.2 21.0 20.3 11.6 7.8 10.9 6.0 100
Free State 30.8 64.1 14.9 12.5 20.1 10.2 18.8 6.9 15.4 6.3 100
Gauteng 10.5 11.0 11.4 10.6 27.4 31.4 27.2 26.5 23.6 20.5 100
KwaZulu-Natal 24.2 34.2 18.8 23.3 25.6 23.6 17.3 10.7 14.1 8.2 100
Limpopo 34.0 40.3 22.3 30.8 24.9 22.2 11.6 4.4 7.2 2.2 100
Mpumalanga 16.7 25.9 20.2 29.6 29.8 20.6 19.9 14.2 13.5 9.7 100
North West 22.7 36.2 15.2 19.3 30.5 40.2 20.5 2.1 11.0 2.2 100
Northern Cape 26.3 41.7 17.7 25.0 21.6 15.0 14.8 7.9 19.6 10.5 100
Western Cape 6.5 19.5 8.0 8.4 23.1 17.2 27.7 23.3 34.6 31.6 100
SOUTH AFRICA 20.0 34.2 20.0 23.9 20.0 22.7 20.0 10.4 20.0 8.7 100
Are the current funding allocations adequate?
The recommended per-learner allocation for each quintile is
determined by the DoE and published annually in the
Government Gazette. A national “table of targets” indicates
the per-learner amount that provinces should allocate to
schools in each quintile to cover non-capital and non-
personnel costs. The school allocation is then calculated by
multiplying the learner allocation by the number of learners
enrolled at the school.
The national targets, in table 6, are pro-poor in that the
year-on-year increases in allocations to schools are greatest
in the lower quintiles, while increases for the upper quintiles
barely keep pace with inflation. The intention is that alloca-
tions to the poorest schools will increase disproportionately
over time, creating a more even distribution of school
resources. 
The Education Department sets an ‘adequacy benchmark’ —
the minimum amount needed to meet the non-personnel and
non-capital costs of a learner’s education. (Teachers’ salaries
are paid directly by the department.) However, Wildeman has
raised concerns about whether this amount is sufficient to
enable schools — particularly those in poor rural areas — to
function effectively. 
Provinces receive an equitable share of the total education
budget. Poorer provinces have a greater proportion of poor
schools and are therefore required to pay out more learner
allocations to schools in the no-fee quintiles than richer
provinces. This may result in wide disparities in funding
allocated to schools in different provinces. 
What are some of the implementation
challenges facing no-fee schools?
The ACESS research highlighted a number of challenges rela-
ting to the management and expenditure of school allocations. 
Provincial variability: The actual transfer of funds to
schools is managed by provincial education departments, but
there is some variation in the way this is managed in different
provinces, which in turn makes it difficult to establish a
consolidated monitoring system.
Transfer delays: Late or unreliable transfers in some
provinces played havoc with school cash flows. This may
improve as a recent amendment to the norms and standards
places an obligation on provincial departments to transfer
payments to public schools before 15 May each year.
Inflexible budgets: Allocations for different budget line
items are often fixed and inflexible. For instance, allocations
for municipal services are sometimes insufficient to cover
costs, and schools are unsure how or where to access funds
to cover arrears. Some rural schools received specific alloca-
tions for municipal services, but had no piped water or
electricity — and were unsure whether or how the funds could
be reallocated to other line items.
Financial management and poor communication: In
section 21 schools, SGBs are required to monitor all funds
received and spent, keep financial records, and prepare
budgets at the start of the new year. Yet schools are not always
informed of the exact amount, purpose and date of transfer of
allocations, making budgets difficult to manage. Provincial
departments are required to notify schools in writing once a
transfer has been made — but this was not always done. 
Lack of capacity: Despite efforts to provide financial
management training to SGBs, the financial reporting
requirements remain complex and onerous, and proper
budgetary management is beyond the capacity of many
schools. Apparently schools in Limpopo that did not submit
annual financial statements by mid-year were penalised by
forfeiting 70% of their allocation. 
Poor management of funds on behalf of section 20
schools: Where provincial departments manage expenditure
on behalf of section 20 schools, challenges include delays in
procurement and service payments, and difficulties in keeping
track of expenditure. Schools are therefore unable to recon-
cile their spending against their budgets, but are still expected
to operate within the confines of their budget allocations.
Better support and training, combined with clear mecha-
nisms to track all transfers into school accounts will promote
better financial management and accountability. 
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Annual per-learner allocation
2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 R738 R775 R807 R855
Quintile 2 R677 R711 R740 R784
Quintile 3* R554 R581 R605 R641
Quintile 4 R369 R388 R404 R428
Quintile 5 R123 R129 R134 R147
Table 6: National targets for the school allocation, 
2007 – 2010
Sources: Department of Education (2006) Amended National Norms & Standards. 
Government Gazette No. 29179, 31 August 2006. Pretoria: DoE.
Department of Education (2007) National Norms and Standards for School Funding.
Government Gazette No. 30332, Notice No. 883, 26 September 2007. Pretoria: DoE.
Note: *The quintile 3 allocation corresponds to the ‘adequacy benchmark’ set by the
DoE.
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How does the policy impact on school revenue
and education quality?
The changes in funding allocations to schools over the period
2005 to 2008 have been redistributive in nature, with the
largest increases going to the poorest schools. 
In order to calculate whether no-fee schools are better or
worse off than before, it is necessary to compare the income
of schools before no-fee status (smaller norms and standards
allocation + school fees) versus the income after being declared
a no-fee school (larger norms and standards allocation + no
school fees). 
Information on school fees for the three-year period 2005
to 2007 was collected from 1,326 schools in Limpopo,
enabling comparison of school revenue over the period when
the no-fee policy was introduced. The Limpopo data showed a
net benefit for no-fee schools, even when taking into account
the loss of fee revenue. In 2006, 92% of schools that became
no-fee increased their revenue by an average of R60,000 per
year. A principal from a Limpopo school commented: 
The school used to charge R55 per learner… which was
very hard to collect from all the parents. Now we receive a
lump sum, which is a great improvement for our budget.
Self-reported school expenditure items before and after no-
fee status suggested large increases in the number of
schools employing support staff (although the allocation is
meant to be spent on non-personnel costs), as well as on
equipment rental, maintenance, telephones and other
services. Some schools said that they now had a budget for
additional teaching resources and extra-curricular activities,
such as sports and music, that were previously unaffordable.
Although a small sample, these findings suggest that no-fee
schools are better off than before.
On the other hand, schools in quintiles 3 – 5 received a
lower per-learner allocation in real terms in 2007 than in
2005. The research strongly suggests that the introduction of
the no-fees policy has worsened the situation in fee-paying
schools and that some are forced to function on less than the
amount the government considers as minimally adequate to
educate a child. The primary reason for the worsening
situation in fee-paying schools appears to be the decline in
fee-paying behaviour.
What are the conclusions?
The introduction of the no-fee schools policy has resulted in
increased revenue for most no-fee schools, while simultane-
ously relieving the burden of school fees on poor parents.
However, increased funding does not imply sufficient funding,
or necessarily result in quality improvements. Many schools
continue to operate on a budget that does not allow for the
delivery of quality education or the provision of school infra-
structure that is conducive to learning. Moreover, non-
personnel resources are merely tools that can support
delivery of education, but the allocation of teachers and
personnel budgets remains inequitable. There remains a
need to review the school funding policy and legislative
framework as a whole to ensure that the policy achieves the
objective of equitable access to quality education. 
Funding policy cannot on its own resolve issues of
inequitable access and poor quality. Commentators have
noted the danger of regarding funding mechanisms as a
substitute for more direct and difficult interventions to
improve education quality. Comparative country studies have
shown that financial inputs do not necessarily translate into
improved educational outcomes. Hanushek warns that South
Africa should be wary of an approach where “eager to improve
quality and unable to do it directly, government policy typically
moves to what is thought to be the next best thing — providing
added resources to schools”. Other essays in this publication
discuss non-financial ways to address education quality in
South Africa. 
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